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Book Reviews

PRACTICAL JUDGING
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION. By Richard
H. Fallon, Jr. 1 Harvard University Press. 2001. Pp. 186.
$35.00.
Brian H. Bix2
The first question many legal academics may ask upon seeing Implementing the Constitution is, "do we really need another
constitutional law book?" At the same time, the fact that the
book is by Richard Fallon will offer some reassurance, as he is
one of our most thoughtful commentators on constitutional issues. This confidence is shown again to be well-placed; the book
is a useful corrective to the too-strident and too-unworldly discussions that frequently dominate discussions of the Constitution.
In this book, Fallon is the voice of Reason: the advocate of
common sense and practicality, against both originalism and the
type of "high principle" advocated by Ronald Dworkin. 3 To the
originalists, he shows how their position, if taken seriously and at
face value, would be unworkable, or at least highly unattractive-and that few advocates of originalism are actually that
dogmatic. 4 (pp. 13-25) A purist on originalism matters would
1.
2.

Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minne-

sota.
3. Fallon also rejects, after only quite brief consideration, the "methodological
pragmatism" sometimes advocated by Judge Richard Posner, under which judges are
instructed to do whatever is best for the future, unchecked by what courts have decided
in the past. Richard A Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1996).
Fallon asserts, reasonably, that this position, at least when read as radically as it sounds,
gives insufficient respect for rule-of-law and democratic values. (pp. 132-33)
4. Fallon also raises the more standard critique of originalism, that it requires an
impossible application of decisions made in another time and a quite different context to
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have to reject precedent, even rather entrenched precedent, that
was contrary to the original meaning of the text, and it is hard to
find any theorist who advocates that. 5 However, "if nonoriginalist precedent is 'law,' appropriately enforced by the Supreme
Court and even binding on it, then central premises of originalism simply cannot be true." (p. 17) If originalism is not the
grounds for all judgments of constitutional meaning, then one
has implicitly admitted that there are principles other than original intention (or original understanding/meaning) involved in
the proper implementation of the Constitution, and the question
remains of what those other principles are and how we determine when they apply. All self-labeled "originalists" pick and
choose, they simply neglect to inform us of the principles they
are using for their selection.
To a high principle view, Fallon insists on the importance of
the judges' role as practical lawyers, trying to find workable solutions to institutional, structural, and political difficulties. (pp. 2636) It cannot be the Supreme Court's 6 role (simply) to determine the content of general moral principles like "equality" or
"due process,'' for it is also the Court's function to implement the
Constitution. Implementation inevitably involves certain compromises and accommodations. (pp. 4-6) Fallon emphasizes
what everyone knows, but few much talk about (at least in academic commentaries): that doing constitutional law (in contrast
to debating it in ivory towers or on talk shows) is largeli about
what is, over the long run, both workable and acceptable.
What is more, these accommodations are not just the "practical" side of high principle (what Fallon sometimes calls "practical judgments" (p. 6)), but also themselves arguably required by
certain constitutional (meta-)principles: in particular, the principle of democracy, and the idea that the Court shares with other
institutions the duty to implement constitutional values. (pp. 3233, 35-36) From both principles, one can derive the view that in
the problems that face us today. (pp. 13-14)
5. As Fallon points out, the mere fact that the theory diverges so far from our actual practices may be a sufficient basis for rejecting originalism as a sensible ideal. (pp.
24-25) He goes on to argue that a Dworkinian emphasis on principle alone is similarly
too far from the way we actually do constitutional law. (p. 28)
6. Fallon's discussion is almost exclusively in terms of the actions and decisions of
the Supreme Court, and the Justices OP that Court. There is little reference to, or discussion of, the other Federal courts or the state courts.
7. One obvious exception to the above generalization is Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale U. Press, 2nd
ed., 1986), though Bickel arguably ends up being far too cautious, while giving too little
weight to the importance of principle.
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cases where reasonable persons can disagree about the meaning
or application of constitutional provisions, the courts should defer to the interpretations of the Constitution express or implicit
in the actions of other officials. 8 (pp. 40-41, 55)
These considerations mean that the Court is not necessarily
wrong when it implements (through its interpretations and doctrinal rules) somewhat less than the full meaning of certain constitutional provisions. (p. 6) Similarly, the Court may also be respondin~ correctly on the occasions (examples may include
Miranda and the libel rule of New York Times v. Sullivan 10 )
when constitutional doctrines are in fact broader than is strictly
required by the meaning of the constitutional text. (pp. 6-7, 4142) To put the same general point a different (and more controversial) way, the Court is bound by an unwritten constitution
which supplements, mediates, and sometimes modifies the written constitution. 11 (pp. 112-26)
Fallon focuses on the less glamorous aspect of constitutional
law-doctrinal rules and tests-as perhaps the best example of,
and argument for, the practical side of implementing constitutional values. (pp. 76-101) Neither originalism nor high-principle
theories answer or explain the challenges that are involved in
developing doctrine, challenges that go far beyond questions of
the meaning of constitutional texts, to considerations of day-today implementation. (pp. 77, 80) The doctrinal tests reflect not
only reasonable disagreement between the Court and others re-

8. Reasonable disagreement plays a double-edged role in Fallon's view of constitutional theory. As discussed, he thinks that the reality of reasonable disagreement often
creates a situation warranting judicial deference to other institutions. On the other hand,
Fallon also cites the phenomenon of reasonable disagreement as a justification for judicial review: that reasonable disagreement creates a need and a role for a deliberative
non-majoritarian institution. (pp. 9-10)
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
II. The idea of an "unwritten constitution" means only that there are sources of
law in constitutional adjudication that cannot be traced to the text of the written constitution; these sources include precedent and interpretive rules, as well as, more generally,
past practices and practical considerations. (pp. 111-12, 117-18)
To the argument that references to an "unwritten constitution" raise problems of legitimacy, Fallon reminds us that written constitutions have their own legitimacy problem.
(pp. 118-24) While there may have been popular consent to the Constitution at the time
of its enactment, it is not obvious why later generations, who have not consented to the
document, should be bound by it. Fallon argues that "the legitimacy of the unwritten
constitution rests on the same conceptual foundations as that of the written Constitution": widespread acceptance combined with the reasonable justice of its provisions. (p.
122)
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garding constitutional meaning, but also reasonable disagreements among the Justices. 12 (pp. 81-82, 92-95, 106-09)
Fallon sees judicial interpretation of the Constitution as
connected to majoritarianism, 1 but in a more intricate way than
John Hart Ely's view that constitutional intergretation must be
confined to representative-reinforcing rulings. " Fallon's view is
that the Court has the right to offer-as law-moral positions
that do not yet have majority support, 15 but these positions must
be grounded in "norms that can fairly be imputed to a broad, inclusive constitutional community," and the Court must be sensitive to the long-term acceptability of its conclusions. 16 (p. 48)
While there is frequently a temptation to say of constitutional theory books-especially those that stay close to the line
of description of current practices (more rational reconstruction
than radical reform)-that they have nothing of interest to tell us
beyond affirming (apologizing for?) what we already do. Fallon
avoids this charge by discussing in some detail what his approach
would have suggested for some of the most controversial recent
cases-testing his theory and at least occasionally coming to unexpected conclusions. (pp. 56-74) Most surprising may be
Fallon's ambivalence and uncertainty about Roe v. Wade. 17
Fallon does not merely question the reasoning of Roe, a standard
position (pp. 62-63); he questions whether the Court should have
reached the result it did, finding that abortion is constitutionally

12. Fallon thus takes common cause with Cass Sunstein's advocacy of "incompletely theorized agreements."' Cass R. Sunstcin, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict
4-5, 35-61 (1996). (pp. 95, 106-07)
13. At other times, Fallon seems to want to raise the (democratic) legitimacy of
judicial review by questioning the (democratic) legitimacy of other forms of decisionmaking: "Even legislation ... seldom represents the truly considered judgment of a majority of the citizenry about the meaning or applicability of ultimate constitutional principles." (p. 9, footnote omitted)
14. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard
U. Press, 1980).
15. Fallon writes: "The Court can reasonably view itself as having a limited proxy to
deliberate about constitutional issues on behalf of the people." (p. 52)
16. Fallon notes that "[tjhis stricture leaves ample space for disagreement and personal vision. In moving from general principles to concrete specifications and particular
legal conclusions, a Justice must inevitably make contestable judgments about how the
community's immanent morality would best be specified." (p. 48)
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (pp. 61-66). Other cases Fallon considers include Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (pp. 56-60); the recent right-to-die cases, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacca v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (pp.
66-69); and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (pp. 69-74). The discussion of
these cases is, at all times, subtle and well-reasoned, but the conclusions reached are not
especially novel or surprising, though the defense of the Court's go-slow response in
Brown (pp. 58-59) is particularly well done.
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protected. 18 (p. 66) While he accepts that the relevant constitutional provisions cover the decision whether to have an abortion,
for Fallon this is of course not the end of the analysis. He argues
that the Court was insufficiently attentive to "concerns of democratic acceptability ... [and] issues of fair allocation of political power. ... " (p. 66) He notes with regret the way that Roe
has led to a much greater politicization of the judiciary and the
judicial nomination process. (p. 66)
The book also does well on the small but significant factors
that frequently sink other law books: Implementing the Constitution does not have unnecessary padding (it is a sleek 137 pages,
excluding the endnotes); and though portions of the book were
published in law journals previously, 19 this book reads nicely as a
single argument, rather than the sort of cobbling together of disparate pieces that one too often finds in legal academic books.
I fear that Implementing the Constitution is destined to be
too little read and too little discussed. That is the usual fate of
theories that are sensible rather than sensational, tending more
towards the cautious than the intentionally provocative. However, those who prefer thoughtfulness to provocation, and reasoned analysis to conclusory polemic, are well-advised to begin
(or, perhaps conclude) their consideration of constitutional theory with Professor Fallon's book.

18. "Even after all these years, it is still not clear (to me, anyway) what the least bad
answer in Roe would have been." (p. 66)
19. Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter·
pretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 54 (1997); How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 535 (1999). (p.
x).

